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Abstract 
 
Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many 
governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling 
governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of 
procedures for decision making by these administrative bodies, including rules 
about transparency and public participation. It also encompasses oversight 
practices provided by legislatures, courts, and elected executives. The way 
that administrative law affects the behavior of government officials holds 
important implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles as well as 
effective governance in society. This paper highlights salient political theory 
and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative state but with 
relevance to the design and application of administrative law in any 
jurisdiction. 
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Administrative Law: The U.S. and Beyond 
Cary Coglianese 
University of Pennsylvania  
 
Administrative law refers to the body of rules and procedures affecting 
government agencies as they implement legislation and administer public 
programs. Yet it is also much more than just rules and procedures. 
Administrative law applies to the ongoing operation of government bodies and 
seeks to shape official decisions that impact businesses and citizens 
throughout society. These decisions include granting licenses, dispensing 
government benefits, conducting inspections and investigations, imposing 
sanctions, issuing orders, awarding contracts, collecting information, hiring 
employees, and even making still further rules and regulations that apply to 
both governmental and private actors. Administrative law affects all of these 
varied decisions and addresses fundamental questions about how government 
authority can and ought to be exercised. It implicates society’s most deep-
seated political and moral values: democracy, equity, efficiency, privacy, 
transparency, and justice. And it does so by intervening in complex and 
diverse organizational environments within which public and private actors 
face varied, often shifting, motivations, incentives, and constraints. A proper 
study of administrative law therefore requires immersion in a wide breadth of 
issues in social science: normative as well as positive political theory; 
individual as well as organizational behavior; and law as well as politics, 
sociology, public administration, and economics. 
 Even when it is just considered as a body of rules, administrative law is 
complex. It draws its legal pedigree from a variety of sources: constitutional 
law, statutory law, internal policy, and, in some countries, common law. 
Government agencies’ organizational structures and routines are shaped by 
provisions derived from both generic procedural statutes (such as, in the US, 
the Administrative Procedure Act) and statutes addressing specific substantive 
policy issues such as energy, education, taxation, or welfare benefits. This 
array of legal sources means that administrative rules and procedures can vary 
significantly across agencies and, even within the same agency, across 
discrete policy issues or types of actions. 
 The social science study of administrative law seeks to make sense of 
the complexity of administrative law and how it shapes, and is shaped by, the 
organizational environments within which it operates. Research has proceeded 
not only to test theoretical propositions about whether and how legal norms 
and institutions influence administrative behavior but also to identify and help 
solve applied problems. Administrative law research is characterized in part 
by prescriptive efforts to design rules that better promote political and social 
values, and in part by empirical efforts to explain how law influences the 
behavior of government agencies. Government agencies often possess 
considerable policy discretion but are staffed by unelected officials, so a key 
objective for administrative law scholars has been to understand how agency 
officials are, or can be, held democratically accountable (Lodge and Stirton, 
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2010). Administrative law places particular emphasis on the empirical 
understanding of the impact of courts and other oversight bodies – as these 
entities purport to hold administrators accountable to elected officials and the 
publics they represent. Although administrative law scholarship has a rich and 
important tradition of doctrinal analysis, the insights and methods of social 
science have become essential for understanding how administrative law and 
legal institutions can affect democratic governance. By drawing on social 
science methods to understand how legal rules and institutions affect 
governance, administrative law scholarship aspires both to inform and to 
improve the outcomes of public institutions. 
 
Administrative Law and Democracy 
 
 Administrative agencies make decisions affecting citizens’ lives and 
entire industries – but these agencies are usually staffed by officials who are 
neither elected nor otherwise directly accountable to the public. A 
fundamental challenge in both positive and prescriptive scholarship has been 
to analyze administrative decision making from the standpoint of democracy. 
This challenge is particularly pronounced in constitutional systems with 
executive bodies that are formally separate from the legislature and where 
political party control can be divided between the branches of government, as 
in the US. But the general challenge applies anywhere because of the 
enormous discretion afforded to unelected administrative officials. Much 
work in administrative law aims either to justify administrative procedures in 
democratic terms or to analyze empirically how those procedures can 
effectuate democratic values. 
 A common way to reconcile decision making by unelected 
administrators with democratic principles has been to consider administrators 
as mere implementers of decisions made through a democratic legislative 
process. Under what is sometimes called the ‘transmission belt’ model of 
administrative law, administrators are treated as mere instruments used to 
implement the will of the democratically controlled legislature (Stewart, 
1975). Statutes serve as the ‘transmission belt’ to the agency, both transferring 
democratic authority to administrative actors and constraining those actors so 
that they advance legislatively approved goals. 
 As a positive matter, the ‘transmission belt’ model underestimates the 
amount of discretion held by administrative officials. Statutes are seldom self-
executing. They need interpretation and must be applied in myriad concrete 
circumstances. In interpreting and applying statutes, administrators assume 
discretion. Statutes do not always speak clearly to the varied circumstances 
that confront administrators. Not only are many of these circumstances 
unanticipated by legislators, but elected officials often may lack incentives for 
making laws clear or precise in the first place, as it can be to their electoral 
advantage to appear to have addressed vexing social problems only in fact to 
have passed difficult policy questions and tradeoffs along to unelected 
administrators. For some administrative tasks, particularly monitoring and 
4 
 
enforcing laws, legislators give administrators explicit discretion over how to 
allocate their agencies’ resources to pursue broad legislative goals. 
 Scholars disagree about how much discretion legislators ought to allow 
administrative agencies to exercise. Minimalists, emphasizing the electoral 
accountability of the legislature, have urged that any legislative delegations of 
authority to agencies be narrowly constructed (Lowi, 1979). Those scholars of 
a more expansionist bent emphasize administrators’ indirect accountability to 
elected officials and contend that legislatures themselves are not perfectly 
representative, especially when key decisions are delegated internally to 
committees and legislative staff (Mashaw, 1985). While the optimal amount 
of authority to be delegated to agencies remains a subject of analysis 
(Stephenson, 2008), in practice administrative agencies continue to possess 
considerable discretion, even under relatively restrictive delegations. 
 Given that agencies do possess discretion, one aim of administrative law 
has been to identify procedures that encourage administrators to exercise their 
discretion in ways that promote both procedural and substantive values. A 
leading approach has been to design administrative procedures to promote 
broad public participation, including representation of a wide array of interest 
groups (Stewart, 1975). Transparent procedures and opportunities for public 
input give organized interests and ordinary citizens an ability to represent their 
views in the administrative process. Such procedures include those providing 
for open meetings, access to government information, hearings, and 
opportunities for public comment, and the ability to petition the government. 
Transparency and participation requirements are defended not only on the 
grounds of procedural fairness, but also because they are expected to deliver 
more information to administrators before they make decisions. These 
procedures may also protect against regulatory capture – the much-decried 
predicament where an agency’s decisions come to promote an industry’s 
private interests to the exclusion of the broader public interest (Stigler, 1971). 
 Although certain requirements, such as the notice-and-comment 
procedure followed by US agencies when making rules, provide the public 
with the opportunity to participate in administrative decision making, this 
does not necessarily mean that any extensive or representative portion of the 
public actually participates in administrative policymaking. Nor does it mean 
that public participation has any significant impact on agency decisions. In the 
US experience, most agency rulemaking proceedings garner only a small 
number of comments – and in most rulemakings by far the largest number of 
these are submitted by businesses or other organized groups rather than by 
what might be considered ordinary members of the public (Coglianese, 2006). 
On occasion, however, agencies will issue high-salience rules that do garner 
thousands of comments – typically short, unsophisticated expressions of 
preferences rather than comments conveying substantive information. 
 As to whether comments, simple or sophisticated, make a difference, the 
answer appears to be at most ‘sometimes.’ Studies find varying degrees of 
association between arguments presented in comments and changes made to 
proposed rules (West, 2004; Yackee, 2005; Shapiro, 2008). Formal comments, 
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though, are submitted only after agencies have invested much staff time in 
developing their proposed rules, a point at which much analysis and decision 
making has already been completed. For this reason, representatives of 
organized interest groups often seek to influence administrative policy by 
making informal contact with officials well before the agency proposes a rule 
and invites formal public comments (Furlong and Kerwin, 2005). Interest 
group representatives may also continue to remain involved with the agency 
after a ‘final’ decision has been made. Whether through litigation or further 
discussions, agencies can be persuaded to issue amendments or make other 
policy changes to otherwise final rules (Coglianese, 1996; West and Raso, 
2012). 
 The widespread use of the Internet has generated interest in so-called e-
rulemaking, or the use of information technology to connect the public more 
closely with the work of administrative agencies. The advent of agency web 
sites has put much more extensive information about administrative matters at 
the fingertips of users around the world (provided, of course, individuals can 
easily navigate through all the extraneous information also taking up space on 
agency web sites) (Coglianese, 2013). Agencies now routinely accept public 
comments submitted by email, and many also have a presence on social media 
sites like Facebook and Twitter (Coglianese, 2013). In the US, the federal 
government has created a one-stop web site called Regulations.Gov which 
indexes agency regulatory proceedings, houses supporting documents and 
previously submitted public comments related to new rules, and provides a 
button for users to submit comments on proposed rules. Although many early 
advocates of e-rulemaking heralded technology’s promise to expand public 
participation in the regulatory process, to date it appears that the patterns of 
commenting on agency rulemaking remain largely unchanged (Balla and 
Daniels, 2007). 
 It should not be surprising that levels of public participation in 
rulemaking remain relatively low, as the subject matter of much 
administrative action remains high in complexity or low in salience – or both. 
However, technology has undoubtedly made it easier for elites inside and 
outside of government to monitor what agencies are doing, as well as for 
scholars of administrative law to study more systematically how 
administrative rules and procedures may better serve democratic principles.  
 
Courts and Judicial Review 
 
 Concern about democracy also undergirds administrative law’s emphasis 
on judicial review of government action. Under well-accepted legal principles, 
courts serve as key enforcers both of the substantive laws that government 
officials are charged with implementing as well as the procedural 
requirements that these same officials must follow in their implementation of 
substantive laws. Courts have also imposed their own additional procedures 
on administrators based on constitutional and sometimes common law 
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principles. A key normative question has centered on how aggressive courts 
should be when it comes to reviewing the actions of administrative agencies. 
 Administrative agencies typically possess a greater capacity for making 
sound technical and policy judgments than do courts. Even in legal systems 
with specialized administrative courts, not only do agency officials and their 
staffs possess greater policy expertise than judges but administrators are also 
often more closely connected to democratic institutions than judges. These 
considerations have long weighed in favor of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies, lest judges disregard either the technical expertise or 
the political legitimacy reflected in many administrative decisions. On the 
other hand, it is also generally believed that some credible oversight by the 
courts bolsters agencies’ compliance with administrative law and may 
improve their overall performance. The prescriptive challenge has been to 
identify the appropriate degree of deference for courts to give to agencies 
overseeing their decision making. 
 Sometimes the degree of deference is said to depend on whether 
agencies are making factual, policy judgments as opposed to making 
judgments about the meaning of the law. Courts might have grounds for 
giving more deference to agencies’ policy judgments, simply ensuring that 
they have followed transparent procedures. Yet courts have also been known 
to take a careful look at policy decisions to see that they are based on a 
thorough analysis of all relevant issues. The latter approach is sometimes 
referred to as ‘hard look’ review in the US, as it calls for judges to probe 
carefully into the agency’s reasoning to ensure that agency officials conducted 
a thorough analysis of policy options before reaching a decision. Although 
one might suspect courts would give less deference to agencies’ legal 
interpretations than to their factual judgments, especially when agencies must 
interpret their own governing legislation, one of the most widely cited US 
Supreme Court opinions calls upon courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous provisions within the statutes they implement (Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 1984). Prescriptive scholarship seeks to provide 
analytic guidance for judges on the appropriate level of deference that they 
should give to both legal and policy choices made by agencies (Zaring, 2010). 
 The proliferation of prescriptive doctrinal principles in contemporary 
legal systems gives rise to the question of what impact administrative law has 
on the actual decision making of judges in deciding cases. After the US 
Supreme Court issued its Chevron decision, lower courts reportedly shifted to 
deferring more to agency interpretations (Schuck and Elliott, 1990). Yet legal 
principles, whether articulated by the Supreme Court or reflected in laws 
adopted by the legislature, are only one factor that may explain how judges 
make their decisions. Just as administrators themselves possess residual 
discretion, so too do judges possess discretion in deciding how deferential to 
be to administrative agencies’ policy and legal determinations. As in other 
areas of law, political ideology also may help explain patterns of judicial 
decision making in administrative law cases (Revesz, 1997; Miles and 
Sunstein, 2006). 
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 In addition to analyzing judicial decision making, the field of 
administrative law has been centrally concerned with the impact of judicial 
review on the behavior of officials within administrative agencies. Normative 
arguments about judicial review typically depend on empirical assumptions 
about the effects courts have on the behavior of administrative agencies. 
Indeed, much legal scholarship in administrative law builds on the premise 
that judicial review, if deployed properly, can improve governance (Edley, 
1990). The effects often attributed to judicial review include making agencies 
more observant of legislative mandates, increasing the analytic quality of 
agency decision making, and promoting agency responsiveness to a wide 
range of interests. Administrators who know that their actions may be 
subjected to review by the courts can be expected to exercise greater overall 
care, presumably making better, fairer, and more responsive decisions than 
administrators who are insulated from direct oversight. 
 Notwithstanding these purported beneficial effects from judicial review, 
scholars have also emphasized courts’ potentially debilitating effects on 
agencies. They have widely accepted, for example, that administrators in the 
US confront a high probability that their actions will be subject to litigation. 
Cross-national research suggests that courts figure more prominently in 
government administration in the US than in other countries (Kagan, 2003). 
The threat of judicial review purportedly creates significant delays for 
agencies seeking to develop regulations (McGarity, 1992). 
 In some cases, agencies have been said to have retreated altogether from 
efforts to establish regulations. The US National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) is usually cited as the clearest case of this so-called 
ossification effect, with one major study suggesting that NHTSA has shifted 
away from developing new auto safety standards in order to avoid judicial 
reversal (Mashaw and Harfst, 1990). Other research, however, indicates that 
the threat of judicial interference in agency decision making has been 
significantly overestimated. Litigation challenging administrative action in the 
United States occurs less frequently than is generally assumed (Coglianese, 
1997), and some research indicates that agencies can surmount seemingly 
adverse judicial decisions to achieve their policy objectives (Jordan, 2000). 
Large-sample studies have failed to confirm the view that judicial review 
significantly obstructs the rulemaking process in the United States 
(O’Connell, 2008; Yackee and Yackee, 2010). 
 Concern over excessive adversarialism in the administrative process 
persists in many countries. Government decision makers have at times 
pursued collaborative or consensus-based processes as alternative strategies 
for creating and implementing administrative policies. In the US, an 
innovation called negotiated rulemaking has been used by some 
administrative agencies in an effort to prevent subsequent litigation. In a 
negotiated rulemaking, representatives from government, business, and 
nongovernmental organizations work toward agreement on proposed 
administrative policies (Harter, 1982). In practice, however, these agreements 
have not reduced subsequent litigation, in part because litigation in the US 
8 
 
over agency rules has ordinarily occurred much less frequently than generally 
assumed (Coglianese, 1997). Moreover, even countries with more consensual, 
corporatist policy structures experience litigation over administrative issues, 
often because lawsuits can help outside groups penetrate close-knit policy 
networks (Sellers, 1995). In pluralist systems such as the US, litigation is 
typically viewed as a normal part of the policy process, and insiders to 
administrative processes tend to go to court at least as often as outsiders 
(Coglianese, 1996). 
 Overall, the impact of the judiciary on administrative governance has 
been and will remain a staple issue for administrative law. Empirical research 
on the meaning and impact of litigation in an administrative setting has the 
potential for informing prescriptive efforts to craft judicial principles or 
redesign administrative procedures in ways that contribute to more effective 
and legitimate governance. 
 
Legislative and Executive Oversight 
 
 In addition to the judiciary, other governmental institutions oversee the 
work of government agencies and may have a significant impact on 
administrative governance. In the US, given its system of separate branches of 
government, administrative agencies find themselves on the receiving end of 
pressure from both legislative and executive officials. Much empirical 
scholarship on administrative law has investigated oversight mechanisms and 
how they affect behavior within administrative agencies. 
 An influential political economy theory treats the procedures imposed by 
legislative and executive overseers as mechanisms of control deployed to 
influence agency outcomes (McCubbins et al., 1987). According to this 
approach, administrative law addresses the inherent principal–agent problem 
confronting elected officials when they delegate power to unelected 
administrators. Administrators inevitably face incentives to implement statutes 
in ways that may stray from the goals intended by the coalition that enacted 
the legislation. Yet it is difficult for legislators and others to monitor agencies 
continually and, in any case, a law’s original enactors do not remain in power 
forever. Elected officials therefore have good reason to create administrative 
procedures with the goal of entrenching the outcomes desired by the original 
coalition. Empirical research, however, suggests that administrative 
procedures provide at best only limited tools for locking in the enacting 
coalitions’ preferences (Balla, 1998). Agencies may be less faithful to the 
enacting coalition’s interests because they are more responsive to the politics 
of the moment than their institutional independence might suggest. Some 
analysis suggests that agencies are actually better reflective of current public 
preferences than are legislatures or elected executives (Stephenson, 2008). 
 An overarching question in research on legislative and executive 
oversight is whether officials from either legislative or executive bodies exert 
the greater degree of influence over administrative agencies. One school of 
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thought posits legislative dominance in the oversight of US agencies, whether 
through the legislation they adopt, their control of agency budgets, or their 
ability to hold hearings or launch investigations (Weingast and Moran, 1983). 
Another school of thought holds that presidents exert more influence, whether 
through their powers to appoint the heads of agencies, direct agencies to 
comply with internal management and analytical requirements, or take the 
leading role in negotiations over agency budgets (Moe and Wilson, 1994). 
Given that agencies operate in a complicated political environment in which 
they are subject to multiple institutional constraints and pressures from both 
legislators and executive officials, the existing evidence seems to provide 
support for both schools of thought. It is clear, in other words, that both 
presidents and legislative officials exert influence over agencies, even if 
neither exercises complete control over administrative action. 
 One way legislatures have sought to influence agencies has been to try 
to direct their policymaking agendas. Not only can a legislature shape the 
direction of an agency by how it structures its delegation of substantive 
authority, but a legislature can also exert influence on the timing of 
administrative action. Statutes can contain deadlines for agency action, 
imposing a legal obligation on agencies to develop implementing rules by a 
specified time. Only a minority – perhaps even only a small fraction – of all 
regulations in the US are established under the stricture of a statutory deadline 
(West and Raso, 2012; Gersen and O’Connell, 2007). However, the legislature 
still prompts the initiation of many more administrative regulatory 
proceedings in the US than do executive branch officials or the courts (West 
and Raso, 2012). The imposition of deadlines also appears to speed up the 
regulatory process, at least modestly (Gersen and O’Connell, 2007). 
 Once an administrative agency decides to initiate a regulatory 
proceeding, in many jurisdictions the agency must conduct a regulatory 
impact analysis that will be reviewed by either a legislative or executive 
branch oversight body (Wiener, 2013; Radaelli and de Francesco, 2010). In 
the US, every president since Ronald Reagan has imposed a requirement that 
agencies develop regulatory impact analyses for their most significant 
administrative rules. Such mandated analyses must be reviewed by a White 
House office called the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 
an oversight body that has been extensively debated by administrative law 
scholars. The dominant theory is that presidents use the OIRA oversight 
process to coordinate regulatory priorities and resolve the principal–agent 
problem that exists between the president and those appointees the president 
selects to head regulatory agencies. As a normative matter, proponents of 
legislative supremacy decry the encroachment of presidents on the work of 
agencies that possess authority delegated to them by statute. Presidentialists, 
on the other hand, favor OIRA review as it offers a mechanism for the one 
official elected in a nationwide election to oversee the ongoing work of 
dozens of agencies that issue hundreds of important rules every year. OIRA 
oversight, based as it is on economic analyses that agencies prepare, has also 
triggered normative debate over the use of benefit–cost analysis in 
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administrative policymaking. Advocates claim that benefit–cost analysis helps 
improve regulatory policy, while opponents claim it only obfuscates decision 
making and delays much needed rules. Concern also exists that business 
interests use the OIRA process as a backdoor means of influencing regulatory 
policy to the detriment of achieving statutory goals or advancing the overall 
public interest. 
 Empirical researchers have been motivated by the normative debate over 
the OIRA process. They have documented that modern presidents have indeed 
sought to use OIRA review to achieve goals consistent with their policy 
priorities, even if these may not always comport with the results of benefit–
cost analysis (Shapiro, 2005). Researchers have also shown that, in practice, 
OIRA review manifests itself differently across different administrations, 
especially in the degree to which interactions between White House and 
agency staff are cooperative or adversarial (West, 2006; Croley, 2003). 
Notwithstanding OIRA’s prominence, agency staff members continue to 
report that they retain considerable discretion in framing and making many 
regulatory policy decisions, even ones formally subject to OIRA scrutiny 
(Bressman and Vandenbergh, 2006). Furthermore, the economic analysis 
produced as part of the OIRA review process appears to have much less 
impact on decision making than many advocates of benefit–cost analysis have 
hoped (Hahn and Tetlock, 2008) – but also much less of an impact in terms of 
delaying regulatory output as opponents of such analysis have feared 
(Coglianese, 2008). 
 Administrative policymaking occurs within a complex political and legal 
environment, one in which legislatures and high-level executive officials 
clearly play important roles. However, even major oversight entities do not 
possess the high degree of control that their proponents desire or their critics 
fear. An ongoing challenge for administrative law research remains to explain 
better the precise effects of legislative and executive oversight under varied 
conditions. 
 
Administrative Law and Governance 
 
 Administrative law lies at several intersections, crossing the boundaries 
of law and politics, political theory and political science, public law, and 
public administration. As the body of law governing governments, the future 
of administrative law rests in expanding knowledge about how law and legal 
institutions can advance core political and social values. A concern with 
democratic principles will continue to dominate research in administrative 
law, as will interest in the role of judicial, legislative, and executive oversight 
in improving administrative governance. Yet administrative law can and 
should expand to meet new roles that government will face in the future. 
Ongoing efforts at deregulation and privatization may signal a renegotiation of 
the divisions between the public and private sectors in many countries, the 
results of which will undoubtedly have implications for administrative law. 
Administrative law also now functions in an increasingly globalized and 
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digital world, with the emerging application of both international 
administrative institutions and new uses of technology that might advance 
both public legitimacy and policy effectiveness – or that might undermine or 
support administrative law institutions. No matter where the specific 
challenges may lie in the future, social science research on administrative law 
will continue to be needed to understand the operation of governmental 
institutions and identify ways to design rules and procedures that can 
potentially increase social welfare, promote the fair treatment of individuals, 
and expand the potential for transparent and democratic governance. 
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